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OO RUEATIB ZNY SSSSS ZOC STATE ZZH STU3587 OO RUEHC DE RUQMKW #4633/01 2331005 ZNY SSSSS ZZH D 200920Z AUG 84 FM AMEMBASSY KUWAIT TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8198 INFO RUQMBI/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI PRIORITY 8550 RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY 5060 RUEHAD/USINT BAGHDAD PRIORITY 3639 RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 4178 RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY 2988 RUEHDO/AMEMBASSY DOHA PRIORITY 5906 RUEHUM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM PRIORITY 1195 RUEHUI/AMEMBASSY JIDDA PRIORITY 0633 RUEHMA/AMEMBASSY MANAMA PRIORITY 8566 RUQMMT/AMEMBASSY MUSCAT PRIORITY 5351 RUEHRH/USELO RIYADH PRIDRITY 3120 RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY 2082 RT

SECRET KUWAIT 4633

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E.O. 12356: DECL: DADR

TAGS: PREL, KU, US, XF, ZP SUBJECT: CODEL SOLARZ MEETING WITH CROWN PRINCE/PRIME

MINISTER

REF: KUWAIT 4626

1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: AUGUST 14 CODEL CALL ON CROWN PRINCE/PRIME MINISTER SAHIKH SA'AD CONTINUED THIRTY MINUTES BEYOND ITS ORIGINALLY SCHEDULED ONE HOUR AND COVERED A BROAD RANGE OF ISSUES INCLUDING THE IRAN-IRAQ CONFLICT, ARAB-ISRAELI DISPUTE, THE PLO LEADERSHIP, LEBANON, THE GULF CORPORATION COUNCIL (GCC), AND THE U.S. REFUSAL TO SELL STINGER MISSILES TO KUWAIT. THE CROWN PRINCE TOLD CODEL, INTER ALIA, THAT HE SAW NO HOPE FOR AN EARLY NEGOTIATION OF THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR AND THAT, ALTHOUGH IRAN HAD NOT LAUNCHED ITS SOUTHERN OFFENSIVE BECAUSE OF CERTAIN FAILURE, TEHRAN WAS IN A DELEMMA WITH MASSIVE NUMBERS OF TROOPS IN POSITION; AN IRANIAN VICTORY WOULD DIRECTLY THREATEN KUWAIT AND THE OTHER GULF STATES. YASIR ARAFAT RETAINS CONTROL OF THE PLO AND DESIRES CREATION OF AN INDEPENDENT PALESTINIAN STATE BEFORE DISCUSSING A SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP WITH JORDAN. KUWAIT WILL SUPPORT ANY AGREEMENT REACHED BY MAJORITY OF PALESTINIANS AND BELIEVES THAT AN INTERNATION CONFERENCE IS NEEDED TO RESOLVE THE ARAB-ISRAEL DISPUTE. INVOLVED PARTIES, INCLUDING SYRIA, MUST AGREE ON A SETTLEMENT. THE GCC HAS PROVEN VALUABLE, PARTICULARLY IN DEFENSE AND SECURITY AREAS; GOK UNDERSTANDS REASONS

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FOR U.S. FACILITIES IN OMAN. GOK WAS DISAPPOINTED BY U.S. TURNDOWN OF STINGER MISSILE REQUEST WHICH FORCED KUWAIT TO TURN TO OTHERS FOR WEAPONRY. CROWN PRINCE WELCOMED FUTURE SUCH VISITS. END SUMMARY.

3. CONGRESSMAN SOLARZ, ACCOMPANIED BY CHARGE, HFAC STAFFER ROTH, POLOFF PATTERSON, AND SOLARZ ADVISER KROLL, BEGAN HIS ROUND OF OFFICIAL CALLS IN KUWAIT WITH A 90 MINUTE CALL ON CROWN PRINCE/PRIME MINISTER SHAIKH SA'AD. ALTHOUGH HIS SPOKEN ENGLISH IS SOMEWHAT WEAK, SHAIKH SA'AD DID NOT USE A TRANSLATOR DURING THE SESSION AND WAS ABLE TO FIELD VIRTUALLY ALL OF THE CONGRESSMAN'S QUESTIONS. THE MEETING GOT OFF TO A RATHER SLOW START, THE CROWN PRINCE PERHAPS HAVING EXPECTED A PROTOCAL SESSION ONLY, BUT DEVELOPED INTO A FRANK AND FULL EXCHANGE IN AN INCREASINGLY CORDIAL ATMOSPHERE.

IRAN-IRAO WAR

- 4. SA'AD TOLD CONGRESSMAN SOLARZ THAT THERE WAS VIRTUALLY NO HOPE AT PRESENT FOR A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT TO THE IRAN-IRAQ CONFLICT. THERE WERE MEMBERS OF THE IRANIAN REGIME WHO APPEARED TO BE SPEAKING IN MORE MODERATE TERMS THAN IN THE PAST--AMONG THEM PRESIDENT KHAMEINI AND SPEAKER RAFSANJANI--BUT IMAM KHOMEINI CONTINUES TO MAKE ALL THE DECISIONS AND REMAINS INTRANSIGENT. IRAN'S LONG-AWAITED SOUTHERN OFFENSIVE HAS NOT MATERIALIZED BECAUSE TEHRAN REALIZES IT IS DOOMED TO FAILURE. STILL, THE CROWN PRINCE ADDED, THE TROOPS HAVE BEEN DEPLOYED AND IRAN CANNOT AFFORD (POLITICALLY) TO SEND THEM HOME. THE GOK CANNOT GUESS HOW THE IRANIANS WILL GET THEMSELVES OUT OF THIS DILEMMA.
- 5. SA'AD DOUBTED THAT IRAN COULD ACTUALLY BLOCK THE GULF, BUT SAID THAT IRANIAN HARASSMENT OF GULF SHIPPING

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WOULD PROBABLY CONTINUE. IF THE GULF WERE BLOCKED, INTERNATIONAL ACTION WOULD BE NEEDED TO REOPEN THE WATERWAY. IN RESPONSE TO THE CONGRESSMAN'S QUESTION ON WHAT ACTION THE U.S. SHOULD TAKE IN SUCH AN EVENTUALITY, THE CROWN PRINCE EMPHASIZED GOK VIEW THAT THE GULF IS NOT THE RESPONSIBILITY OF ANY INDIVIDUAL COUNTRY; EFFORTS TO KEEP THE GULF OPEN SHOULD BE MADE THROUGH THE UNITED NATIONS "OR UNSC."

- 6. TO CONGRESSMAN SOLARZ' QUESTION AS TO KUWAIT'S POSITION SHOULD IRAN DEFEAT IRAQ, THE CROWN PRINCE RESPONDED QUICKLY "GOD FORBID THAT SHOULD HAPPEN!" HE EXPLAINED THAT AN IRANIAN VICTORY DEEPLY WORRIES KUWAIT: "WE WOULD NOT BE SURPRISED IF THE IRANIANS PROCEEDED TO KUWAIT." HE REMINDED CODEL THAT TEHRAN HAD REPEATEDLY THREATENED TO "PUNISH" THE GULF STATES FOR THEIR SUPPORT FOR IRAQ.
- 7. SA'AD TOLD CODEL THAT THE RELIGIOUS LOYALTIES OF KUWAIT'S SHIA POPULATION WAS DIVIDED, BUT THAT HE BELIEVED THEIR POLITICAL LOYALTY WAS SOLIDLY BEHIND THE GOK. HE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT SOME LOCAL SHIA REMAIN FAITHFUL TO AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI BUT AT THE SAME TIME THEY OPPOSE HIS POLICIES. OTHERS SUPPORT SHARYAT MADARI AS THEIR IMAM, WHILE STILL OTHERS ARE LOYAL TO AL-KHOI' FROM NAJAFF IN IRAQ. THE CROWN PRINCE GAVE NO INDICATION THAT HE BELIEVED KUWAIT'S SHIA MINORITY POSED A THREAT TO THE COUNTRY'S STABILITY.

ARAB-ISRAEL DISPUTE

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8. SA'AD INITIALLY RESPONDED TO CODEL'S QUESTION ON THE ARAB-ISRAEL DISPUTE BY STATING THAT HE DID NOT WANT TO SPEAK ON BEHALF OF THE PALESTINIANS, BUT THAT HE BELIEVED UN RESOLUTIONS 242 AND 338 WERE CLEAR BASES FOR RESOLUTION OF THE CONFLICT. HE WENT ON TO SAY THAT IT WOULD BE A WASTE OF TIME TO NEGOTIATE WITH ANYONE BUT PLO LEADER YASIR ARAFAT. ASKED ARAFAT'S POSITION, THE CROWN PRINCE (FYI; WHO IS ARAFAT'S FREQUENT HOST IN KUWAIT. END FYI) SAID THAT THE PLO LEADER WANTS THE FORMATION OF AN INDEPENDENT STATE FIRST, WITH CONSIDERATION OF FEDERATION OR CONFEDERATION WITH JORDAN TO FOLLOW. TO CODEL'S QUESTION AS TO GOK'S RESPONSE SHOULD A SPLIT APPEAR WITHIN THE PALESTINIAN COMMUNITY OVER THE DIRECTION NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD TAKE, SA'AD RESPONDED THAT KUWAIT WOULD SUPPORT THE "MAJORITY."

- 9. THE CROWN PRINCE DID NOT REACT DIRECTLY TO SOME SCENARIOS OUTLINED BY CONGRESSMAN SOLARZ FOR RESOLVING THE DISPUTE BUT ESSENTIALLY SAID KUWAIT WOULD FULLY BACK WHATEVER WAS ACCEPTABLE TO THE PALESTINIANS. HE OFFERED, HOWEVER, THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO PRECONDITIONS PLACED ON SUCH NEGOTIATIONS; THAT KUWAIT WOULD HAVE DIFFICULTY ACCEPTING NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL UNLESS ISRAEL WITHDREW FROM ALL TERRITORIES OCCUPIED IN 1967, AND EVEN THEN, NORMALIZATION MIGHT TAKE SOME TIME; AND, FINALLY, THAT ANY AGREEMENT WOULD HAVE TO ACCEPTABLE TO ALL; SYRIA, FOR EXAMPLE, COULD BLOCK ANY AGREEMENT TO WHICH IT WAS NOT A PARTY. IN OTHER WORDS, AGREEMENT ON THE WEST BANK AND GHAZA WOULD NOT SUFFICE WITHOUT AGREEMENT ON THE GOLAN HEIGHTS AS WELL.
- 9. ASKED IF THE U.S.SHOULD ATTEMPT A NEW INITIATIVE FOLLOWING THE NOVEMBER ELECTIONS, THE CROWN PRINCE INTERJECTED; "WHY NOT TODAY INSTEAD OF TOMORROW? WHY WAIT?" ON FORM, SA'AD SAID THAT AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE SHOULD BE SUPPORTED, (APPARENTLY REFERRING TO THE RECENTLY RESURRECTED SOVIET PROPOSAL) BECAUSE, AMONG OTHER REASONS, THE U.S. HAS SHOWN ITSELF UNABLE TO PERSUADE ISRAEL TO WITHDRAW FROM OCCUPIED TERRITORIES ON THE WEST BANK AND GHAZA. IN RESPONSE TO A RELATED QUESTION, SA'AD TOLD CODEL THAT KUWAIT WOULD NOT OPPOSE A RESUMPTION OF SOVIET-ISRAELI DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS.
- 10. WHEN CONGRESSMAN SOLARZ ASKED SA'AD THE MEANING OF THE SPRING 1983 INCIDENT IN WHICH ARAFAT HAD APPARENTLY REACHED AGREEMENT WITH KING HUSSEIN ONLY

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TO HAVE THE AGREEMENT OVERTURNED BY THE PLO EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE IN KUWAIT, THE CROWN PRINCE ASSERTED THAT HE HAD NOT FOLLOWED THE ISSUE. NEVERTHELESS, HE ADDED, THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT ARAFAT REMAINS THE LEADER OF THE PLO. ON THE SPLIT BETWEEN ARAFAT AND SYRIAN PRESIDENT HAFIZ AL-ASSAD, THE CROWN PRINCE COMMENTED THAT AL-ASSAD FELT ARAFAT HAD ATTEMPTED TO ACT WITHOUT CONSULTING THE SYRIANS. SA'AD OPINED THAT THE DISPUTE HAD BECOME "PERSONAL" BETWEEN THE TWO MEN, NOTED THAT FARUQ QADDUMI (ABU LUTF) HAD HELD LENGTHY DISCUSSIONS WITH AL-ASSAD "LAST WEEK," AND SAID HE HOPED THAT TIME WOULD HEAL THE RIFT.

LEBANON

11. IN RESPONSE TO CODEL'S QUESTION, THE CROWN PRINCE SAID THAT ISRAEL'S WITHDRAWAL FROM LEBANON COULD NOT BE

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"LUMPED TOGETHER" WITH A SYRIAN PULLBACK. HE REMINDED CODEL THAT SYRIA HAD ENTERED LEBANON AT THE REQUEST OF THE LEBANES; "WHEN THE GOL ASKS THEM TO LEAVE, THEY WILL GO." SA'AD CONTINUED, HOWEVER, THAT AL-ASSAD WOULD PULL HIS TROOPS OUT WHEN THE ISRAELI (SIC) GOVERNMENT HAS SORTED ITSELF OUT AND STABILITY HAS BEEN RESTORED IN LEBANON. HOWEVER, IF THE U.S. DOES NOTHING TO INSURE IMPLEMENTATION OF UNSC RESOLUTIONS 508 AND 509, NEW CONFLICT IN LEBANON WOULD BE UNAVOIDABLE. BROADENING HIS COMMENT TO INCLUDE THE ARAB-ISRAEL CONFLICT IN GENERAL, THE CROWN PRINCE SAID THAT "NO ONE BELIEVES THE U.S. CANNOT PUT SUFFICIENT PRESSURE ON ISRAEL TO WITHDRAW FROM LEBANON OR FROM OTHER OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. IF THE U.S. CONCLUDES THAT THE TIME IS NOT RIGHT FOR PROGRESS, WAR IS INEVITABLE."

GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL (GCC)

12. THE GCC HAS PROVEN A VALUABLE FORUM FOR EXCHANGES OF VIEWS BETWEEN THE MEMBER STATES, SHAIKH SA-AD TOLD CODEL. THERE IS AGREEMENT ON DEFENSE POLICY AND THERE ARE IMPORTANT EXCHANGES OF SECURITY-RELATED INFORMATION.

"AS A KUWAITI, I AM PLEASED AT THE PROGRESS MADE THUS FAR," HE ADDED. SA'AD INITIALLY DEMURRED WHEN CODEL ASKED HIS REACTION TO PRESENCE OF U.S. FACILITIES ON OMAN'S MASIRA ISLAND. HE THEN SAID THAT THE GOK HAD DISCUSSED THE ISSUE WITH THE OMANIS AND "REALIZED" THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE U.S. PRESENCE. HE ADDED; "AS LONG AS THE PRESENCE OF FOREIGN FORCES DOES NOT LEAD TO INTERNAL INTERFERENCE, WE UNDERSTAND."

EGYPT'S RETURN TO THE ARAB LEAGUE

- 13. IN RESPONSE TO CODEL'S QUESTION, THE CROWN PRINCE SAID THAT "FOR THE TIME BEING" EGYPT'S RETURN TO THE ARAB LEAGUE WOULD BE "DIFFICULT." THE QUESTION WOULD HAVE TO BE LEFT FOR THE FUTURE, HE CONCLUDED, WITHOUT FURTHER EXPLANATION.
- U.S. REFUSAL OF STINGER MISSILE REQUEST
- 14. CONGRESSMAN SOLARZ ASKED SHAIKH SA'AD IF HE HAD ANY QUESTIONS FOR CODEL. THE CROWN PRINCE RESPONDED BY COMMENTING THAT HE SAW "NO LOGIC" IN THE U.S. ADMINISTRATION'S REFUSAL TO MEET KUWAIT'S REQUEST FOR STINGER SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILES. HE CONTINUED THAT KUWAIT AND THE U.S. HAD BEEN TRYING TO STRENGTHEN THEIR BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP BUT THAT THE U.S. HAD MADE A "MISTAKE" BY TURNING DOWN THE REQUEST. BY MEETING THE REQUEST--EVEN IF THE TOTAL NUMBER OF MISSILES REQUESTED HAD NOT BEEN SUPPLIED IMMEDIATELY--THE U.S. WOULD HAVE "PROVED ITS FRIENDSHIP." SHAIKH SA'AD SAID THAT THE GOK KNEW OTHER COUNTRIES COULD SUPPLY SIMILAR WEAPONS, AND WAS NOW FORCED TO TURN TO THEM FOR WEAPONRY. GONGRESSMAN SOLARZ ASKED WHY THE GOK HAD NOT GONE TO "OTHERS" FIRST, TO WHICH THE CROWN PRINCE REPLIED; "WHEN IN NEED, WE FIRST TURN TO OUR FRIENDS." CONGRESSMAN SOLARZ TOLD THE CROWN PRINCE THAT HE DID NOT HAVE A PERSUASIVE ANSWER FOR THE REFUSAL, BUT THAT HE WOULD PURSUE THE QUESTION WHEN HE RETURNED TO WASHINGTON. SHAIKH SA'AD THANKED CODEL, OBSERVING IN CLOSING, THAT "OTHERS" (ARMS SUPPLIERS) "WILL NOW SAY: WHY DIDN'T YOU COME TO US FIRST.'

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CONCLUSION AND COMMENT

15. THE CROWN PRINCE WARMLY THANKED CONGRESSMAN

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SOLARZ FOR HIS VISIT AND SAID SINCERELY HE HOPED OTHER MEMBERS OF CONGRESS WOULD FOLLOW. CODEL ASKED IF SA'AD HAD VISITED THE U.S. AND WAS TOLD THAT HE HAD NOT YET MADE THE TRIP BUT WOULD LIKE TO DO SO (FYI; CODEL WAS UNAWARE THAT GOK HAD BEEN FLOATING THE IDEA OF A VISIT BY THE CROWN PRINCE SINCE LATE 1983. END FYI). THE MEETING WHICH LASTED THIRTY MINUTES BEYOND THE ALLOCATED ONE HOUR, WAS HIGHLY SUCCESSFUL. ALTHOUGH CAUGHT SOMEWHAT OFF BALANCE BY CONGRESSMAN SOLARZ' DIRECT STYLE AND SUBSTANTIVE QUESTIONS, THE CROWN PRINCE WARMED TO THE OCCASION AS THE MEETING PROGRESSED AND APPEARED GENUINELY PLEASED WITH THE ENCOUNTER. SHAIKH SA'AD'S COMMENTS ON THE STINGER TURNDOWN ARE THE CLEAREST REACTION WE HAVE THUS FAR RECEIVED FORM THE GOK. IN ALL LIKELIHOOD THE GOK CHOSE THIS MEETING TO MAKE ITS POINT. AS CODEL MEETING WAS UNDERWAY, A SOVIET DELEGATION WAS IN TOWN TO FINALIZE DETAILS OF ITS SALE TO THE GOK OF WEAPONS SYSTEMS NEGOTIATED DURING DEFMIN SHAIKH SALEM'S RECENT MOSCOW VISIT. AS PRIOR REPORTING HAS INDICATED, A STINGER SUBSTITUTE MAY BE PART OF THAT PACKAGE. WHETHER OR NOT THE GOK SERIOUSLY EXPECTED WE WOULD PROVIDE STINGER AT THIS TIME, SHAIKH SA'AD SEEMD GENUINELY DIS-APPOINTED THAT, IN THE GOK'S VIEW, THE REQUEST WAS REFUSED.

16. CODEL HAS NOT CLEARED THIS CABLE. SHAFT

END OF MESSAGE